I. INTRODUCTION
The big issue in corporate governance scholarship is changing.
Over the last fifteen years, the academic and policy debate has focused on hostile takeovers. The terms and tenor of the debate in the the current debate but straightforward in light of a more complicated taxonomy, that the appropriate distinction is between systems that support a diversity of shareholder distributions and systems that essentially support only controlling shareholder distributions. From this perspective, the United States and Sweden, typically thought of as, respectively, the quintessential widely held and controlling shareholder systems, have much more in common with each other than Sweden has with most other controlling shareholder systems.
Important early work on controlling shareholder regimes has taken two general directions. The first, reflected in a series of articles by Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,3 linked the breadth of shareholder distribution to the quality of a jurisdiction's law. In this account, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions whose legal systems do not protect minority shareholders from dominant shareholders' diversion of private benefits of control. As a result, a controlling shareholder who takes a company public will not part with control; if she does, someone else will purchase control in the market and exploit her. The second direction finds the explanation for concentrated ownership patterns in politics. In an important book, Professor Mark Roe identified social democratic politics as the driving force toward ownership concentration.4 Where labor, through politics, speaks with a unified voice, capital must concentrate to respond effectively.
While they provide important insights, neither scholarly direction sufficiently explains the patterns of shareholder distribution we observe. As Professor Roe notes, we observe controlling shareholder regimes in jurisdictions with good law, so law cannot completely explain the distribution.5 At the same time, we observe controlling shareholder regimes in countries without serious social democratic movements, so politics is likely not all of the answer either. Additionally, because both approaches are essentially path dependency accountsthe initial condition, whether quality of law or character of politics, dictates the pattern of shareholder distribution -they lack an efficiency account of the success of some controlling shareholder regimes. As I have argued elsewhere, "the path dependent characteristics of a given national governance system confront the disciplining effects of the operative selection mechanisms. In the end, institutions are shaped by a form of corporate governance plate tectonics, in which the demands of current circumstances grind against the influence of initial 3 See sources cited infra note 20.
conditions."6 Thus, a more complete explanation for the distribution of shareholdings must incorporate politics, law, and efficiency, together with the serendipity of each country's initial condition.
My effort to complicate the analysis of controlling shareholders and corporate governance proceeds as follows. Part II sets out some necessary background concerning both the phenomenon to be explained and prior efforts at explanation. Part III provides a framework to structure the analysis: the controlling shareholder tradeoff. Part IV begins to complicate the controlling shareholder taxonomy by defining good law functionally rather than formally, and then distinguishing between two very different kinds of controlling shareholders: efficient and inefficient. The result is to replace the sharp dichotomy between controlling shareholder and widely held shareholder distributions with two more textured categories: controlling shareholder regimes with functionally bad law and regimes that have functionally good law and support a diversity of shareholder distributions. This second group includes both Sweden, which is characterized by companies with controlling shareholders, and the United States, which is characterized by companies with widely held shareholdings. Part V continues the effort at complication by distinguishing between two different kinds of private benefits of control: pecuniary and nonpecuniary. This distinction provides insights into the macroeconomic consequences of even efficient controlling shareholder systems and into the dynamics that influence the systems' stability. Part VI concludes with a brief consideration of some policy implications that arise from a more complicated taxonomy of controlling shareholders.
II. BACKGROUND: FACTS AND GENERATIONS OF SCHOLARSHIP
At the risk of belaboring a familiar point, it is helpful to start by recounting the actual ownership structure of publicly traded corporations. Over the last ten years, important empirical work has revealed that, excluding the United States and the United Kingdom, the worldwide corporate governance landscape has a monolithic feature: control of publicly traded corporations is typically lodged in a single individual, family, or group.' Professor Marco Becht, for example, reports that 82.5% of German listed companies, 65.8% of Italian listed companies, and 64.2% of Swedish listed companies have a blocking shareholder minority of at least 25%.8 Moving the control level up to a majority lowers the percentage of listed companies with a control block to 64.2% in Germany, 56.1% in Italy, and 26.3% in Sweden,9 but the importance of controlling shareholders remains dramatic. In nine East Asian countries, Professors Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang found that a single shareholder has control in more than two-thirds of listed firms.1' When faced with the empirical reality that systems in which control of most listed companies is in the public float are the exception rather than the rule, scholars' and policymakers' initial reactions reflected a teleological view of the evolution of capital markets. They saw a U.S./U.K.-style widely held distribution of stock ownership and control as the end point of corporate governance development; progress consisted of accelerating what selection would make inevitable. Although there were some early skeptics who argued for the continued vitality of alternative systems -Professor Masahiko Aoki with respect to "J-model" governance in Japan16 and Professors Julian Franks and Colin Mayer with respect to "inside systems" in Europe" were among the most tenacious -the belief that widely held shareholder systems are superior seemed to influence global policy. A preference for dispersed shareholdings was plainly evident in the International Mone- In turn, this critical view of controlling shareholder regimes received academic support from a growing "law and finance" literature that sought to reveal the empirical links between the quality of legal regimes on the one hand, and the nature of national capital markets and corporate governance systems on the other.20 For present purposes, a particular claim is central to these accounts -that a controlling shareholder structure is associated with "bad law." In jurisdictions in which minority shareholders are not protected from controlling shareholders extracting large private benefits of control, the argument runs, entrepreneurs will not part with control through public offerings for fear of subsequent exploitation by an investor who could assemble control through the market and extract private benefits, unchecked by the legal system. Under this analysis, controlling shareholder systems will be characterized by weak equity markets -too much liquidity tied up in control blocks -and by large differences in the value of controlling and minority blocks as a result of private benefit extraction by the controlling shareholder.
This brings us to an emergent generation of scholarship that stresses two themes. The first, largely positive, argues that the parsi- What... all these slogans [concerning Japanese capital market reform] add up to is a general belief that (i) the principles according to which the typical neoclassical economics textbook says the economy ought to work are a priori correct principles, (2) those principles are best exemplified in the American economy, (3) the rightness of those principles is further confirmed by American success, and (4) Japan's present plight is not just a cyclical phenomenon and a debt-deflation hangover from the bubble; it is the natural and wholly just retribution visited on Japan for not following those principles. To complicate matters further, controlling shareholders come in different forms -for example, families as opposed to widely held corporations -and hold control through different devices. As we have seen, some controlling shareholders' control is matched by their equity investment, while others' control is leveraged through structural devices like dual class stock and pyramids. Early empirical studies suggest that, at least in some countries, the level of private benefit extraction differs among different types of controlling shareholders. Benefit extraction is lower when the controlling shareholder's stock is widely held than when it is family owned, and when the divergence between control and equity is smaller.24
Recognizing the various types of controlling shareholders and their potential for impacting minority shareholders differently gives rise to a second, and as yet more tentative, theme in the new generation of controlling shareholder scholarship: what, after all, is wrong with controlling shareholder systems? Here the concern is normative. If controlling shareholder regimes do not necessarily lead to the extraction of large private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders, is there really a problem? In turn, this point reads back on the 21 See ROE, supra note 4. Professor Roe's emphasis on politics as a determinant of shareholder distribution focuses on good law jurisdictions, but it is equally applicable to bad law jurisdictions. The demand for law is, tautologically, politically driven. Thus, as we will see later, there will be a political story in every jurisdiction. be inconsistent with their independence. Takeovers, in turn, are rather blunt instruments: they are responsive to only some kinds of governance problems,28 and the large premium necessary for success both emphasizes their large transaction costs and makes them appropriate only for very large problems. From this perspective, a controlling shareholder may police the management of public corporations better than the standard panoply of market-oriented techniques employed when shareholdings are widely held. This point motivates the efficiency defense of controlling shareholder systems. Because she holds a large equity stake, a controlling shareholder is more likely to have the incentive either to monitor managers effectively or to manage the company itself and, because of proximity and lower information costs, may be able to catch problems earlier. Rather than being the result of functionally bad law, a controlling shareholder system is in this view an alternative to the frictions associated with ameliorating the separation of management and control that inevitably arises from widely held shareholdings.29
The second element of the public corporation agency problem is the conflict between a controlling shareholder and noncontrolling shareholders over the extraction of private benefits of control -benefits to the controlling shareholder not provided to the minority shareholders (and that drive the bad law/controlling shareholder regime nexus). Thus, controlling shareholder monitoring as a means to ameliorate managerial agency problems also comes with frictions. Conditional on maintaining control, the less equity the controlling shareholder has, the greater the incentive to extract private benefits; increased productivity accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity, while private benefits of control are allocated based on governance power. In other words, a controlling shareholder may increase productivity by effectively managing the company or by effectively monitoring managers, but also may take more than her share of the gain. IV, leveraged control may create an incentive to adopt strategies that reduce productivity when private benefits of control are increased sufficiently.
While these two elements appear distinct, there is a point of tangency between them. Because controlling shareholders must bear the direct costs of monitoring, liquidity, and nondiversification from holding a concentrated position, some private benefits of control likely are necessary to induce a party to play that role. Thus, from the viewpoint of public shareholders, the two elements of the corporate agency problem present a tradeoff. Public shareholders will prefer a controlling shareholder as long as the benefits from the reduction in managerial agency costs exceed the detriment of the controlling shareholder's extraction of private benefits.
Framing the controlling shareholder structure as an alternative to governance techniques such as independent directors and takeovers, the attraction of which depends on a tradeoff between increased monitoring and increased private benefit extraction, provides a framework to understand better the complexity of controlling shareholder systems and the role of law.
Different law may result in particular controlling shareholder systems having very different costs and benefits.
IV. COMPLICATING THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER TAXONOMY: DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
The central implication of the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework is that simply having a controlling shareholder governance system is too general an observation to tell us very much. To be frank, it is hardly a startling intuition that a taxonomy that divides the world into two categories -the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and everyone else on the other -does not tell us very much about the rest of the world. The payoff has to come from the complications that follow.
A first cut at a more complicated taxonomy recognizes that a national pattern of concentrated control of publicly traded corporations can be consistent with two very different equilibria. First, the ownership pattern may reflect a structure of inefficient controlling shareholders, in which bad law allows the cost of private benefit extraction to exceed the benefits of more focused monitoring of managementminority shareholders are net worse off from the controlling shareholder's monitoring effort. Alternatively, the ownership pattern may reflect a structure of efficient controlling shareholders, in which good law helps the benefits of more focused monitoring exceed the costs of private benefit extraction -minority shareholders are net better off from the controlling shareholder's monitoring effort. From this per-spective, an inefficient controlling shareholder regime is a drag on the financial system, while an efficient controlling shareholder regime can be a preferred alternative to market-based monitoring.
This first step toward a more complex typology proves to have a good deal of explanatory value. Without the ambition of being exhaustive, I survey the implications that follow from distinguishing between inefficient and efficient controlling shareholder systems in the remainder of this Part.
A. Inefficient and Efficient Controlling Shareholder Systems and the Quality of Law
First, a more complex taxonomy provides a context for understanding the more nuanced empirical studies of controlling shareholder systems and, in particular, how different legal and quasi-legal institutions support varying ownership patterns. For purposes of this inquiry, I have in mind a legal realist's concept of law that is broader than typically reflected in the law and finance literature. Good law limits private benefits of control to amounts that are smaller than the increased productivity from more focused monitoring. To accomplish this outcome, good law must specify substantive standards, require sufficient disclosure that those with the power to enforce the standards know of violations, and provide an effective enforcement process.31
Such a sored press is complementary to the formal disclosure process.35 Although it is relatively easy to describe the requirements of good law in this broader functional sense, it is much more difficult to capture empirically except through simple backward induction36 -countries with low private benefits of control must have functionally good law.37 Now recall that the initial claim made in the law and finance literature is that controlling shareholder systems are associated with functionally bad law: entrepreneurs retain control to protect themselves against private benefit extraction by someone who might subsequently assemble control if the existing controller gave it up. Having retained control, the entrepreneur then exploits it by extracting private benefits of control. This framework has clear empirical implications. In inefficient controlling shareholder systems, (i) the value of controlling shares should be dramatically greater than minority shares; and (2) the extent of private benefits will decrease with the amount of the controlling shareholders' equity holdings and increase with the difference between percentage of control and percentage of equity. In contrast, efficient controlling shareholder systems will be characterized by functionally good law: that is, law and related social institutions that effectively limit private benefit extraction to an amount sufficient to compensate a controlling shareholder for the costs of focused monitoring, but less than the benefit all shareholders receive from such monitoring. Thus, in efficient controlling shareholder systems (3) the value of controlling shares will exceed that of minority shares by a much smaller amount than in inefficient controlling shareholder systems.
The new generation of scholarship supports all three implications of the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework. The level of private benefit extraction should be reflected in the difference in value between controlling and minority shares; only the value of controlling shares includes the net present value of expected private benefits of control. As shown in Table 3 36 For example, Professors Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales argue that a strong press is an alternative to good law; it may fill gaps in the formal disclosure regime and, by publicizing normviolating conduct, fill gaps in the formal enforcement regime through public shaming. See id. Here I note simply that the public press is itself much more effective when there is an effective legal disclosure regime. Thus, one may reason backwards from the presence of an effective press to the existence of an effective disclosure regime.
37 While the discussion in the text defines good law and bad law by reference to protection of minority shareholders from a controlling shareholder, one can also identify bad law for widely held shareholder systems. For example, takeover law that allows target directors to resist a takeover is bad law for widely held companies and irrelevant for controlling shareholder companies except to the extent that it reduces the value of widely held companies relative to companies with a controlling shareholder. difference between the market price of high-voting and low-voting shares,38 or by the size of the premium paid for a controlling block of shares. 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=3i1275. The authors do not address why the legal improvement actually worked. In a country like South Korea, where a controlling shareholder structure is commonplace and private benefits of control are large, one would expect that the new outside directors would not bring to their new job a commitment to constraining a pattern that was commonplace in the business community. Thus, while the empirical support for the important role of outside directors is strong, the explanation for that role remains interestingly ambiguous.
46 Id. at 36. Making the same point a little differently, the authors state: "We do not find strong evidence that better governed firms are more profitable or pay higher dividends. Instead, investors appear to value the same earnings or the same current dividends more highly for bettergoverned firms." Id. Id. at 5. The authors report that they "found a positive relationship between R&D and market value only after controlling for the eventual control by the major shareholder." Id. at 23.
an efficient controlling shareholder system supports a diversity of shareholder distributions, including both companies with a controlling shareholder and companies with widely distributed shareholders, while an inefficient controlling shareholder system only supports companies with a controlling shareholder. As a third step, in section IV.C, I argue that this understanding of the relationship between quality of law and the character of a country's shareholder distribution undercuts the usual distinction between widely held and controlling shareholder regimes.
B. Functional Convergence and Diversity
of Shareholding Concentration In an efficient controlling shareholder system, concentration of control operates as a cost-effective response to the managerial agency cost problem. It is observed when the benefits of more focused monitoring exceed the limited extraction of private benefits of control allowed in a country with functionally good law. This represents a form of functional convergence -within limits, different corporate governance systems may solve the same monitoring problem through different institutions. 47 We can also expect diversity -different firm-level ownership patterns -within the same efficient controlling shareholder system. The efficiency advantages of having a controlling shareholder in a system with good law -a system that minimizes the potential for private benefit extraction -depend on the value gain that results from more focused monitoring of management performance than is possible with market-based techniques like independent directors and the market for 
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an efficient controlling shareholder system. We should see companies with both controlling shareholders and widely held shares.52 In contrast, the controlling shareholder tradeoff framework predicts much less diversity of ownership structures within an inefficient controlling shareholder system. In the absence of constraints on pecuniary private benefit extraction by a subsequent acquirer of control, an existing controlling shareholder cannot part with control without running the risk of subsequent exploitation. The only viable strategy for a controlling shareholder who lacks the taste for control would then be to sell control to someone who would more effectively use that control, rather than dissipate control through a public offering. To be sure, this analysis does not rule out the presence of any widely held companies in an inefficient controlling shareholder regime. For example, companies that begin as widely held, perhaps through privatization, may survive, especially if the nature of the business restricts the opportunities for transferring value to a controlling shareholder. Nonetheless, we would expect there to be less diversity of shareholder distribution among companies in an inefficient controlling shareholder system than in an efficient controlling shareholder system. The available data support this prediction. Table 4 shows the percentage of widely held and family-controlled public corporations in Sweden, an efficient controlling shareholder system, and in Italy, an inefficient controlling shareholder system. While Sweden exhibits rough parity between publicly traded companies with a controlling shareholder and those with widely held shareholder structures, Italy 
2006] CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS I66i
tributions on the one hand, and inefficient controlling shareholder systems on the other, finds further support in empirical research. Data suggest that companies with controlling shareholders, and especially family controlling shareholders, perform worse than comparable widely held companies in inefficient controlling shareholder systems,18 but better than comparable widely held companies in efficient controlling shareholder systems, at least when the family member involved in the company's operations is the founder rather than an heir."9 This outcome is consistent with the controlling shareholder tradeoff developed in Part III. Where functionally good law constrains the level of private benefits of control, minority shareholders benefit from a controlling shareholder's more focused monitoring, leading to better performance. Absent constraints on private benefits, minority shareholders are net worse off with a controlling shareholder. In countries in which good law supports diverse patterns of shareholding, the cost of a controlling shareholder increases when power shifts from the founder to an heir. Yet this is not a problem of the legal system, but a regression to the mean in the talents of the founders' families.
V. COMPLICATING THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER TAXONOMY: PECUNIARY VERSUS NONPECUNIARY PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL
In Part IV, I extend the standard good law/bad law account of controlling shareholder systems by complicating the taxonomy to distinguish between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder systems. I argue that an efficient controlling shareholder system has much more in common with a widely held shareholder system than with an inefficient controlling shareholder system: both widely held and efficient controlling shareholder systems support diversity in shareholder distributions among companies, while an inefficient controlling shareholder system does not. While this analysis puts the United States and Sweden on the same side of a functionally good/functionally bad law divide rather than on opposite sides of a divide based on the prevalence of controlling shareholders, there remains the question of the differences between the two systems. While we observe controlling shareholders in both systems, publicly held Swedish companies are characterized by controlling shareholders but U.S. public companies are characterized by widely held shareholdings. 
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At this point, however, the good law/bad law distinction has exhausted its explanatory power. Within the spectrum of good law systems, we must look to other factors to explain the distribution of shareholdings. To some extent, the characteristics of particular companies may explain the distribution on a company-by-company, industry-by-industry basis. In some industries and in some circumstances, a controlling shareholder structure may be superior. In others, a widely held shareholder structure may prove advantageous. Finally, the two patterns of shareholdings may in some circumstances be functional substitutes; that is, they may have equivalent monitoring capacity. In the absence of extremely competitive markets and rapid technological or market change, the domain over which the two patterns are substitutes may be substantial.
In that circumstance, the ultimate outcome may be path dependent; that is, the pattern that develops will turn on a set of initial conditions driven by factors other than efficiency, and with the passage of time will prove costly to change even if a different pattern later becomes more efficient.60 So, for example, recent studies of the origins of the shareholding patterns in the United Kingdom and Sweden, both functionally good law jurisdictions, stress local, nonefficiency factors as explanations for each jurisdiction's path toward a widely held or controlling shareholder system.61 Once on that path, given a system of widely held shareholding pattern in the United Kingdom). In both cases, the path dependency story is quite different than the law and finance story. In the law and finance account, the existence of good law gives rise to widely held and efficient controlling shareholder systems. In these path dependent accounts, the direction of causation is reversed, with initial serendipity giving rise to a shareholding pattern that then demands good law. In the Swedish case, once politics allowed the leading families to lock in control, a demand arose to assure that the locked-in controllers did not steal. See H8gfeldt, supra. Professor John Coffee argues persuasively that this was the direc-functionally good law, there is little to cause a change. Both systems support efficient production and will persist unless significant environmental changes or, as we will see, firm-specific problems substantially alter the balance. For example, in an efficient controlling shareholder system the frictions that hold the pattern in place include the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes on the sale of a controlling position.62
A more important determinant, however, grows out of the fact that even if functionally good law keeps the size of pecuniary private benefits of control small, it may do little about nonpecuniary private benefits. This distinction, I argue, is central to understanding the distribution of controlling shareholders and widely distributed shareholdings in a good law system. In particular, persistence in shareholder distribution in efficient controlling shareholder systems will strongly depend on the persistence of controlling shareholder tastes. Thus, the next step is to further complicate the controlling shareholder taxonomy by looking more carefully at the concept of private benefits of control, a central but to this point largely unexplored element of the analysis. In U.S. corporate law, the concept is similar (although termed "self-dealing"). The highest standard of judicial review is reserved for a transaction in which a controlling shareholder receives something of value to the exclusion and detriment of minority shareholders. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 other benefits that, without more, involve no transfer of real company resources and do not disproportionately dilute the value of the company's stock to a diversified investor. For example, control of a large company in a small economy may provide a desirable social status for the controlling family.64
The existing literature, both analytical and empirical, focuses almost exclusively on pecuniary benefits of control, although typically without acknowledging the distinction between the two categories.65 This can be seen most clearly in the empirical literature. Whether measured by differences in value between high-and low-voting classes of common stock, or by the premium paid for a control block relative to the value of the entire firm, these amounts reflect the capitalized value of real resources diverted to the controlling shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders.66 As we have seen, a number of studies show that the market values the same cash flows differently when produced by a company with an inefficient controlling shareholder as opposed to an efficient controlling shareholder.67 The difference is pecuniary private benefits of control.
Focusing on pecuniary private benefits of control, however, raises a real quandary. The empirical evidence shows very low pecuniary private benefits in efficient controlling shareholder systems. But holding a controlling position imposes costs in illiquidity and lack of diversification on the controlling shareholder, in addition to the actual cost of monitoring. Why then do we ever observe controlling shareholders in countries with functionally good law -namely, those with widely held and efficient controlling shareholder regimes -if controlling shareholders can extract only limited amounts of pecuniary private benefits of control? Unlike in an inefficient controlling shareholder system, in this system controlling shareholders are free to sell their positions without fear of exploitation by a new controller. The answer lies in the realm of nonpecuniary private benefits of control. Almost tautologically, nonpecuniary benefits must play a prominent role in regimes in which functionally good law keeps pecuniary private benefits low. 64 A good analogy could be made to the difference between common values and private values in the economics of auctions. In a common value auction, the asset has the same value to all bidders. In a private value auction, the asset's value depends on the bidder. See R. Preston McAfee While a comprehensive exploration of nonpecuniary private benefits of control requires considerably more attention than I can devote here,68 a hypothetical setting can serve to motivate the analysis. Suppose that a controlling family has a net worth of $4 billion, all invested in the controlled firm. What does the family's utility function look like? What does the family maximize? Suppose that a potential acquirer will pay a $300 million premium for the family's controlling interest because the acquirer can increase the company's productivity or capture synergies. The family confronts a tradeoff: control of a major industrial company versus a 7.5% increase in family wealth. Is maintaining the role of leading industrialists in a country, with the social and political access associated with that role, worth more than additional wealth at a point where decreasing marginal returns to wealth must surely have set in?69
To generalize the intuition, the existence of private benefits of control means that for the controlling shareholder the separation theorem does not apply; that is, the controlling shareholder's utility is affected by company decisions in ways other than through the decisions' impact on the company's stock price.70 Thus, maximizing the controlling shareholder's utility may mean something other than maximizing the value of the corporation. As with complicating the concept of a controlling shareholder in Part IV, complicating the concept of private benefits of control has a number of interesting implications.
A. Explaining the Difference Between the United States and Sweden
The distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits of control helps explain the continuing differences between the incidence of controlling shareholders in the United States and Sweden. The United States is characterized by widely held shareholder distributions, while Sweden is characterized by controlling shareholder distributions, even though in both countries functionally good law supports, and we observe, both patterns of shareholdings. Controlling A first observation turns on the relative size of the two economies. Because the Swedish economy is relatively small, a group of fifteen families was sufficient to dominate. Being one of fifteen leading families provides a social and political position for which there is no counterpart in the United States, whose economy is simply too large for a small number of families to play a comparable national role. Neither Warren Buffett nor Bill Gates, for example, looks like an American version of the Swedish Wallenbergs. Thus, in the United States nonpecuniary private benefits of control are likely to be generally smaller and local rather than national, which suggests that we should observe fewer companies with controlling shareholders. The lower level of nonpecuniary benefits of control should also increase the rate at which controlling shareholders and their heirs dissipate control. Entrepreneurial companies making an initial public offering almost always have a controlling shareholder. As we see in section V.B, the rate of reduction in control by the entrepreneurs' heirs increases as the level of nonpecuniary benefits goes down.
A second observation builds on the first. We should observe controlling shareholders in those U.S. industries in which nonpecuniary private benefits of control are likely to be most pronounced. So, for example, one would expect to find controlling shareholders in major newspaper companies because running a major national newspaper puts one at the center of major public and cultural issues, with the potential to influence the outcome. And in fact, companies that operate the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal have controlling shareholders.71 Studies report that a dual class capital structure like that of Dreamworks,72 designed to facilitate maintenance of control without a controlling share of a company's equity, disproportionately occurs in the printing, publishing, and communications industries, as well as in media firms73 and sports teams.74
Thus, the incidence of controlling shareholders in the United States and Sweden, countries in which functionally good law supports both widely held and controlling shareholder distributions, reflects not only the serendipity of where the two countries started,75 but the potential for continuing nonpecuniary private benefits of control as well.
B. Macroeconomic Implications of Nonpecuniary Private Benefits of Control
The empirical evidence supports the proposition that minority shareholders are not uniquely disadvantaged in an efficient controlling shareholder system. Good law keeps diversion of pecuniary private benefits of control low and, in a reasonably efficient stock market, the costs of these payments for focused monitoring, as well as the risk that the talent of future generations of managers will regress to the mean, will be priced. Unlike in inefficient controlling shareholder systems, here minority shareholders are playing in a basically fair game.
The inquiry, however, does not end with the position of minority shareholders. The significant role for nonpecuniary private benefits of control has macroeconomic effects that impact a country as a whole. I take up three such situations.
Consider first the failure of separation just discussed. Some controlling shareholders' preferences may simply reflect misjudgment or overconfidence. To the extent that the controlling shareholder or her heirs wish to go on directly managing the company, there may be a powerful inclination to overinvest in the company's existing businesses -those with which the family manager is more comfortable -even though other opportunities that require different managerial skills may offer higher returns. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder may prefer to enter new businesses about which she knows little but that are alluring personally; the transformation of the businesses in which companies associated with the Bronfman family engaged -from liquor and oil to entertainment -is an example.76 To the extent these controlling shareholder structure that loses its advantage, but does not deteriorate substantially, when management passes to the next generation. There is a plausible explanation for the difference in performance -both overall and with respect to the slower deterioration after management shifts from founder to heir -between family-controlled and widely held companies in the United States and controlling shareholder firms in other countries with functionally good law (countries that support both widely held and controlling shareholder distributions). The United States, unlike for example Canada or Sweden, is not characterized by pyramid ownership structures through which families control multiple levels of firms. Controlling families in the United States typically do not leverage their equity to control more than one company.82 Thus, outside the United States, the effect of less skilled heirs managing a company is both exacerbated by the greater difficulty of running a diversified company and multiplied over a larger asset base. A final implication may be the most significant. As Part IV suggests, efficient controlling shareholder systems have greater diversity in patterns of shareholder distribution. Part of this diversity is positive -driven by the fit between particular companies and industries on the one hand, and the monitoring techniques associated with controlling shareholder or widely held shareholder distributions on the other. But part of this diversity may be negative -reflecting the absence of market pressures on controlling shareholders to respond to changes in the external economic environment and of market mechanisms to impose those changes from the outside when the controlling shareholder fails to respond.
The insulation of the controlling shareholder from market pressure is not always bad. As I have argued previously, "institutions matter when they fit existing industrial technology."83 The stability that a controlling shareholder can provide may be quite effective when, as with the happy match between Japanese corporate governance and industrial organization over a large part of the post-War period, it supports firm-and team-specific worker human capital investment, and the industry experiences largely linear technological change.84 The converse, however, is also true: "[I]nstitutions matter when they do not fit with the industrial technology demanded in a state of the world dif-ferent from that which gave rise to the governance institutions in the first place.""5 When companies and industries must adapt quickly to large and abrupt changes in the economic environment, the stability associated with an efficient controlling shareholder system becomes a barrier to necessary adaptation; in this circumstance, a widely held shareholder system, with control open to the market, likely will be more efficient.86 In particular, a widely held shareholder system facilitates a dynamic cycle between public and private ownership that polices adaptivity. When a public company experiences managerial underperformance, the private equity market can mount an acquisition through buyout funds that will put into place a highly incentivized, intensively monitored governance structure that is suited to fixing the problem. Then, because the buyout funds typically must liquidate after ten years, the now "fixed" company is taken public again to allow the distribution of liquid assets to the buyout fund's investors."7 If it is difficult to design a system with both the adaptivity of a widely held shareholder system and the stability of an efficient controlling shareholder system, the choice will depend on one's predictions of the future: will the environment be one that favors adaptation or stability? The public/private dynamic found in widely held controlling shareholder systems may serve to balance this tradeoff.
C. Ameliorating Influence I: The Potential Instability of Efficient
Controlling Shareholder Systems Some factors work to ameliorate an efficient controlling shareholder system's insulation from market pressures for change. Precisely because nonpecuniary private benefits are idiosyncratic to the particular controlling shareholder and because the identities of controlling shareholders change with generations, it is plausible to expect changes in the value of the nonpecuniary private benefits of control over time, whether from lifecycle changes, increased wealth within a single generation, or intergenerational changes in tastes or abilities. At some point, the wealth gain from adaptation reflected in a large acquisition premium, or an increase in market value from giving up control and hiring professional managers, outweighs the nonpecuniary private benefits of control that a controlling shareholder experiences -a process that can be expected to accelerate as succeeding generations experience greater regression to the mean in managerial skills88 and as the number of family members actively involved in the company increases.
As a result, efficient controlling shareholder systems will tend to deteriorate simply from the gravity of generations. For example, the recent SNS Economic Policy Group report notes with respect to Sweden that "[o]nly a few of the 'fifteen families' who used to dominate Swedish industry remain major owners in a position of control."89 To the extent that the deterioration is driven by a control premium that increases with the value that would result from change, the timing of the deterioration at least may be influenced in the direction of efficiency: the greater the efficiency gain from adaptation, the faster the deterioration of the controlling shareholder system.90 
D. Ameliorating Influence II: Public Pressure on Efficient
Controlling Shareholders There is reason to think that external pressure may operate as a constraint on controlling shareholders. Academics have considered the role of public opinion primarily as a force for reducing pecuniary private benefits of control in bad law countries, essentially as a substitute for an effective legal system.92 Public opinion-driven policing of nonpecuniary private benefits of control, however, may prove more difficult. For public opinion to operate as a constraint, two conditions are necessary (although not necessarily sufficient). First, the controlling shareholder's conduct must be observable to the public, which is why the most promising empirical study of the role of public opinion as a constraint on private benefits of control uses newspaper circulation as a measure of public opinion.93 Second, and for present purposes more difficult, there must be a shared public conception that the observed behavior is wrong. This is plausible with respect to pecuniary private benefits of control -the principle that "thou shalt not steal" is surely widely shared, and diversion of company cash flows for the benefit of a controlling shareholder may well be understood as stealing. However, the range of behaviors that provides nonpecuniary private benefits of control may lack the same public consensus. Thus, the extent to which public opinion acts as a constraint on nonpecuniary private benefits of control likely is quite sensitive to the particular manifestation of the private benefit and to local culture. For example, the extent to which nepotism is viewed as improper may differ widely among jurisdictions. More importantly, the characteristics that give rise to nonpecuniary private benefits of control are plainly culturally influenced. For example, the maintenance of family control -the private benefit of being a leading family -may be more highly valued in Asia than it is in the United States. Thus, Asian controlling shareholders may be willing to forgo more potential value to keep control in the family, and the public may be sympathetic to that preference, with the result that a controlling shareholder pattern may persist longer in Asian than in Western countries. To be sure, culture and economics are related in complicated ways. In inefficient controlling shareholder systems, a cultural attribute that assigns great value to the nonpecuniary private benefit of maintaining family control reinforces the economic motivation to maintain control to avoid being exploited later as a noncontrolling shareholder. Conversely, the continued globalization of commerce, which increases the opportunity cost of maintaining family control through forced competition with more efficiently organized companies, will inevitably erode the cultural assessment of the value of control. As yet, however, we know very little about the dynamics of the interaction between culture and economics in determining the sources and relative value of nonpecuniary private benefits of control.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this Article, I argue that a good deal can be learned by looking at the usual taxonomy of controlling shareholders through the framework of the controlling shareholder tradeoff: focused monitoring in return for some private benefits of control and at a cost in speed of adaptation. In particular, the framework highlights the value of distinguishing between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder systems, and between pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits of control. Together, the two distinctions reframe the taxonomy of shareholder distribution to distinguish between regimes that support companies with a diversity of shareholder distributions and regimes that support only companies with a controlling shareholder. I now conclude by briefly considering two policy implications -the first broad, the second narrow -that are suggested by this more complicated controlling shareholder taxonomy.
A. Eliminating Inefficient Controlling Shareholder Systems:
Better Law or More Market Exposure?
One straightforward implication of a more complicated taxonomy is the need to eliminate inefficient controlling shareholder systems. This can be attempted by three different, but not mutually inconsistent, strategies. First, an inefficient system can be attacked directly by improving the legal system to constrain pecuniary private benefits of control to levels that, net of these costs, leave minority shareholders better off as a result of focused monitoring. At that point, the country will have transformed into an efficient controlling shareholder system that is supported by nonpecuniary private benefits of control, which are subject to the ameliorating influences discussed in Part V. Second, an inefficient system can be attacked indirectly by changing legal rules and supporting institutions to increase the exposure of control to the market. Third, improved access to global capital markets may in some circumstances provide a self-correcting market solution for inefficient controlling shareholder systems, acting to dissipate a controlling shareholder's position in just those circumstances when the social costs of underperformance are the greatest.
I. Improving the Legal System. -Improving the legal system generally involves eliminating deficiencies in three areas: the standards that make significant pecuniary private benefits of control unlawful; the disclosure process that allows those with the power to enforce the legal standards to observe pecuniary private benefits of control; and the public and private enforcement mechanisms available to prosecute violations. This process can be slow, and it certainly requires a political moment when the public perception of the need for reform outweighs the influence of entrenched inefficient controlling shareholders, but there is some evidence that it can happen. 94 Recent reform in Italy may be a case in point. Recall that empirical studies show that in Italy private benefits of control amount to as much as 29% to 37% of total firm value.95 In 1998, Italy adopted legislation that made it significantly easier for minority shareholders to pursue derivative litigation against management appointed by a controlling shareholder. 97 Dyck & Zingales, supra note 35, at 570. Unfortunately, the Dyck and Zingales sample contains only six observations of a controlling shareholder block sale before the 1998 reform, and additional reforms to its legislation governing groups of companies dominated by a controlling shareholder.98 In addition to expanding the circumstances in which voting control imposes liability on the controlling shareholder for mismanagement, the legislation imposes broader disclosure obligations for transactions with the controlling shareholder.99 With respect to decisions actually influenced by the controlling shareholder, the legislation requires disclosure of the reasons behind such decisions.100 While these reforms do respond to the demands of substantive standards and disclosure necessary to a good law regime, it remains uncertain whether the need for strong enforcement will be met. In the end, the effectiveness of enforcement depends on matters of civil procedure and judicial efficiency, about which commentators have expressed reservations.101 Further, the enforcement effect of nonjudicial institutions, like the public press, depends on cultural beliefs regarding whether pecuniary private benefits of control are improper.
Notwithstanding the potentially important but still uncertain efforts in Italy, legal reform may move quite slowly in some countries. As may turn out to be the case in Italy, even if legislation states standards of conduct more aggressively and requires more effective disclosure, reform may still founder on the enforcement process.102 If, for example, a country lacks a sophisticated, independent, and effective court system, it may be a time-consuming process to create one, even if political barriers can be overcome. Without effective enforcement, improved standards and tougher disclosure rules are unlikely to be enough. In the free cash flow-motivated takeover, the bidder shared the gains from redeploying free cash flow through the premium paid for the target's stock; the remainder went to the acquirer through improved target performance. In an inefficient controlling shareholder takeover, the bidder would share the gains from eliminating pecuniary private benefits of control through the premium paid for 75% of the company's equity. 109 In contrast, the breakthrough rule's threat to control in efficient controlling shareholder systems would be substantially more muted. Because of the low level of pecuniary private benefits of control in an efficient controlling shareholder system, there would be no easy source of premiums for would-be bidders. To be sure, controlling shareholders would sometimes have to increase their equity ownership to 25% plus one share to protect control, thereby increasing the control costs of focused monitoring and in particular circumstances shifting the outcome of the controlling shareholder tradeoff, but European Unionwide, the balance would seem to be positive.
3. The Operation of the Capital Market To Dissipate a Controlling Position. -That leaves the third, market-based approach to improving the operation of inefficient controlling shareholder systems. In these systems, poorly managed companies and those from whom controlling shareholders have siphoned pecuniary private benefits of control may require additional capital, especially to respond to the globalization of their markets and to new, more efficient foreign competitors. For these companies, internally generated funds will be insufficient, requiring recourse to the capital market. In this context, external suppliers of debt or equity can be expected to insist on a means to dissipate the controlling shareholder's influence if poor performance threatens the new investment. I suggested the use of performancebased conversion as a means of constraining controlling shareholders four years ago.110 Just such a technique was used recently with respect to a prominent controlling shareholder in Italy. In order to raise $3 billion from Italy's largest banks to finance a 2002 restructuring, 108 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 87, at 398-453. 109 The threat of a hostile bid, the strategy of which is to reduce target company pecuniary private benefits of control, may give rise to a virtuous cycle. For controlling shareholders who wish to maintain control and retain at least nonpecuniary private benefits, the best strategy may be to eliminate pecuniary private benefits themselves before the hostile takeover comes. This was the U.S. experience with free cash flow-motivated leveraged buyouts (LBOs). To forestall a hostile bid, companies voluntarily took the steps an LBO bidder would have taken after a successful bid, thereby eliminating the source of the premium. See Bengt Holstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and z1990os, shareholder systems, we need to better understand the micro-level dynamics of this ownership structure. As the focus of corporate governance scholarship shifts to controlling shareholder systems, we need to think small.
